Prof. Dr. Eva Hoppe-Fischer
Contact Information
Institute for Applied Microeconomics
Adenauerallee 24 - 42
Room 83
53113 Bonn
Phone: 49 228 73-9211 (secretariat)
Email: eva.hoppe@uni-bonn.de
Office hours by appointment
Affiliations
Centre for Economics Policy Research (CEPR) - Research AffiliateMain Research Interests
- Contract Theory
- Experimental Economics
- Behavioral Economics
Curriculum Vitae
Publications
- Hidden Action and Outcome Contractibility: An Experimental Test of Moral Hazard Theory (with Patrick W. Schmitz)
Games and Economic Behavior, forthcoming. - Do Sellers Offer Menus of Contracts to Separate Buyer Types? An Experimental Test of Adverse Selection Theory (with Patrick W. Schmitz)
Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 89, 2015, 17–33. - Contracting under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences: An Experimental Study (with Patrick W. Schmitz)
Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 80 (4), 2013, 1516-1544. - Public-Private Partnerships versus Traditional Procurement: Innovation Incentives and Information Gathering (with Patrick W. Schmitz)
RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 44 (1), 2013, 56-74. - Observability of Information Acquisition in Agency Models
Economics Letters, Vol. 119 (1), 2013, 104-107. - Public-Private Partnerships versus Traditional Procurement: An Experimental Investigation (with David J. Kusterer and Patrick W. Schmitz)
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 89, 2013, 145-166. - Can Contracts Solve the Hold-Up Problem? Experimental Evidence (with Patrick W. Schmitz)
Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 73 (1), 2011, 186-199. - Conflicting Tasks and Moral Hazard: Theory and Experimental Evidence (with David J. Kusterer)
European Economic Review, Vol. 55 (8), 2011, 1094-1108. - Behavioral Biases and Cognitive Reflection (with David J. Kusterer)
Economics Letters, Vol. 110 (2), 2011, 97-100. - Public versus Private Ownership: Quantity Contracts and the Allocation of Investment Tasks (with Patrick W. Schmitz)
Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 94 (3-4), 2010, 258-268. - The Costs and Benefits of Additional Information in Agency Models with Endogenous Information Structures (with Patrick W. Schmitz)
Economics Letters, Vol. 107 (1), 2010, 58-62.
