Prof. Dr. Eva Hoppe-Fischer

• Contact Information
• Affiliations
• Main Research Interests
• Curriculum Vitae
• Working Papers
• Publications
• Teaching

Contact Information

Adenauerallee 24 - 42
Room 083

53113 Bonn

Tel: +49 228 73-9213 or +49 228-9211 (secretariat)
Email: eva.hoppe@uni-bonn.de

Office hours by appointment

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Affiliations

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Main Research Interests

• Contract Theory
  

• Experimental Economics
  

• Behavioral Economics

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Curriculum Vitae

 Download full CV

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Working Papers

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Publications

• Do Sellers Offer Menus of Contracts to Separate Buyer Types? An Experimental Test of Adverse Selection Theory (with Patrick W. Schmitz)
  Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 89, 2015, 17–33.
• Contracting under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences: An Experimental Study (with Patrick W. Schmitz)
  Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 80 (4), 2013, 1516-1544.
• Public-Private Partnerships versus Traditional Procurement: Innovation Incentives and Information Gathering (with Patrick W. Schmitz)
  RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 44 (1), 2013, 56-74.
• Observability of Information Acquisition in Agency Models
  Economics Letters, Vol. 119 (1), 2013, 104-107.
• Public-Private Partnerships versus Traditional Procurement: An Experimental Investigation (with David J. Kusterer and Patrick W. Schmitz)
  Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 89, 2013, 145-166.
• Can Contracts Solve the Hold-Up Problem? Experimental Evidence (with Patrick W. Schmitz)
  Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 73 (1), 2011, 186-199.
  
• Conflicting Tasks and Moral Hazard: Theory and Experimental Evidence (with David J. Kusterer)
  European Economic Review, Vol. 55 (8), 2011, 1094-1108.
• Behavioral Biases and Cognitive Reflection (with David J. Kusterer)
  Economics Letters, Vol. 110 (2), 2011, 97-100.
• Public versus Private Ownership: Quantity Contracts and the Allocation of Investment Tasks (with Patrick W. Schmitz)
  Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 94 (3-4), 2010, 258-268.
• The Costs and Benefits of Additional Information in Agency Models with Endogenous Information Structures (with Patrick W. Schmitz)
  Economics Letters, Vol. 107 (1), 2010, 58-62.

Teaching

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