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Prof. Dr. Eva Hoppe-Fischer


Contact Information

Adenauerallee 24 - 42
Room 083
53113 Bonn
Tel: +49 228 73-9213 or +49 228-9211 (secretariat)


Office hours by appointment


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Centre for Economics Policy Research (CEPR) - Research Affiliate


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Main Research Interests

  • Contract Theory
  • Experimental Economics
  • Behavioral Economics


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Curriculum Vitae

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Working Papers


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  • Do Sellers Offer Menus of Contracts to Separate Buyer Types? An Experimental Test of Adverse Selection Theory (with Patrick W. Schmitz)
    Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 89, 2015, 17–33.
  • Contracting under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences: An Experimental Study (with Patrick W. Schmitz)
    Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 80 (4), 2013, 1516-1544.
  • Public-Private Partnerships versus Traditional Procurement: Innovation Incentives and Information Gathering (with Patrick W. Schmitz)
    RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 44 (1), 2013, 56-74.
  • Observability of Information Acquisition in Agency Models
    Economics Letters, Vol. 119 (1), 2013, 104-107.
  • Public-Private Partnerships versus Traditional Procurement: An Experimental Investigation (with David J. Kusterer and Patrick W. Schmitz)
    Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 89, 2013, 145-166.
  • Can Contracts Solve the Hold-Up Problem? Experimental Evidence (with Patrick W. Schmitz)
    Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 73 (1), 2011, 186-199.
  • Conflicting Tasks and Moral Hazard: Theory and Experimental Evidence (with David J. Kusterer)
    European Economic Review, Vol. 55 (8), 2011, 1094-1108.
  • Behavioral Biases and Cognitive Reflection (with David J. Kusterer)
    Economics Letters, Vol. 110 (2), 2011, 97-100.
  • Public versus Private Ownership: Quantity Contracts and the Allocation of Investment Tasks (with Patrick W. Schmitz)
    Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 94 (3-4), 2010, 258-268.
  • The Costs and Benefits of Additional Information in Agency Models with Endogenous Information Structures (with Patrick W. Schmitz)
    Economics Letters, Vol. 107 (1), 2010, 58-62.

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